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COMPULSORY UNDERGROUND WIRING-A BATTLE
REJOINED IN PUBLIC UTILITY LAW
NEALE F. HOOLEY t
TJHE MANNER in which our public utilities route their power has
long been a source of controversy within our courts. Indeed, no
sooner were power lines erected than litigation commenced concern-
ing the manner in which they had been constructed and the various
routing patterns that had been effected in different local areas. The
earliest public utility case law in point appears to portend the eventual
arrival and necessity of underground wiring. The potential problems
and practical difficulties surrounding this transition in power facilities
were evidenced very early in the life of compulsory underground wiring
legislation, as students of New York City history are well aware. Cer-
tainly, little public utility legislation was so earnestly contested, so
persistently ignored, and so voluminously litigated as the compulsory
underground wiring statutes affecting that city which were enacted
during the latter part of the nineteenth century.' The legal turmoil
continued even after a corporation had been formed for the specific
purpose of constructing "subway" systems for miles of power conduit
found within Manhattan Island when the subject of rates was brought
to the bar for determination.' The final acceptance of compulsory un-
derground wiring in large cities might well be considered as the com-
pletion of phase one in the modern transition of power wiring. We
are now faced with phase two of this physical evolution in the
manner of power routing - the feasibility, practicality and authority
of a municipality or less densely populated area to enact compulsory
underground wiring ordinances, and the ensuing right of public utilities
thereby affected to initiate rate variations which reflect the cost of
such enforced relocation of existing power facilities.
That the coming years will see increased legislative activity con-
cerning the subject of underground wiring is not open to question or
t Assistant Counsel, Consolidated Edison Company of New York, Inc. A.B.
1953, St. Francis College (Pa.); LL.B. 1956, Villanova University.
1. N.Y. Sess. Laws 1884, ch. 534; Id. 1885, ch. 499; Id. 1886, ch. 503; Id. 1887,
ch. 716.
2. See City of New York v. Prendergast, 202 App. Div. 308, 309, 311, 195
N.Y.S. 815, 817 (1st Dep't 1922); FIRST, SECOND AND THIRD ANNUAL REPORTS OF
THE BOARD oF ELECTRICAL CONTROL FOR THE CITY OF NEw YORK (1887, 1888, 1889).
(80)
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COMPULSORY UNDERGROUND WIRING
conjecture. Certainly, public utility case law bears ample evidence of
this fact. Of further import is the recent trend in New York toward
immeasurably strengthened zoning provisions,3 the underlying consid-
erations of which serve as a mutual foundation for compulsory under-
ground wiring legislation. It is our purpose to present the current
status in New York with respect to compulsory underground wiring
legislation, hereinafter referred to as wiring ordinances, in such a
manner as to successfully serve the reader as a guide to future activity
in this area of the law.
Hitherto, wiring ordinances have relied heavily on the "congested
area" theory in establishing their purpose and legality and, of neces-
sity, have had definite and rather immediate geographic boundaries.4
Thus, ABC City might legislate locally for underground wiring within
its business district, stating within the ordinance that its provisions
were applicable only to that portion of the city bounded on the north
by X street, on the east by Y street, and so on. The most recent
legislative counterparts, however, are basically of two types: (1)
those which refer to a definite but presently non-congested area, and
(2) those which are considerably more inclusive in their applicable
area. An example of the latter is set forth below, and will be used
as a basis for discussing the modern style of wiring statute throughout
this article.
In considering our subject - the validity and effect of com-
pulsory underground wiring ordinances - we shall proceed in the fol-
lowing fashion: First, we shall commence with a study of the mu-
nicipality's power to enact ordinances, including the procedural re-
quirements regulated by state law. Secondly, we shall consider the
substantive limitations which must be observed by the municipality
that desires to enact local laws governing the installation of power
facilities. Lastly, we shall analyze the utilities' right to reflect the
cost of such facility transition in their appropriate rate schedules, with
particular attention being paid to the factual interpretation of the term
"rate discrimination."
3. The court of appeals recently sustained the validity of the City of Buffalo's
zoning ordinance which contains a three year amortization clause, thus following
the lead of eleven other jurisdictions: California, Colorado, Florida, Iowa, Kansas,
Louisiana, Maryland, New Jersey and Texas by case law and Illinois and Virginia
by statute; Harbison v. Buffalo, 4 N.Y.2d 553, 152 N.E.2d 42 (1958). The strength
of this decision is apparent in light of the fact that the offending business was
initiated and carried on for twenty-nine years in a nearly identical manner and
style prior to the enaction of the zoning ordinance under consideration. The case
was remanded to a lower court for a final determination of damages with the in-
struction that the ordinance was to be enforced unless the damages determined by
the court were found to be very severe, in which case the business would be allowed
to continue in its present location.
4. E.g., New Rochelle, N. Y., General Ordinances § 7-41(a) (1958).
FALL 1959
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A typical compulsory underground wiring ordinance of recent
origin (September 24, 1958) reads:
"All utility wires and lines and electrical wires supplying
current to non-residential buildings hereafter erected or to any
real estate development consisting of two or more private resi-
dences which are hereafter erected shall be placed under the
surface of the street and under the surface of the ground leading
to said building or residences." 5
I.
MUNICIPAL ORDINANCES.
A study of municipal wiring legislation in New York must neces-
sarily commence with the procedural provisions whereby such power
is derived. The present stage of de-centralized legislative power which
exists by virtue of the City Home Rule Law is the product of modern
necessity and legislative convenience, having evolved to its present
state in three definite steps over the last century. The importance of
understanding this procedural transition is found in the fact that
not only does it enable one to reconcile the leading case law dealing
with the right of a municipality to enact wiring legislation, but it
also illustrates the present legislative perspective in this area of the law.
A. The Power of Municipalities to Enact and Enforce Ordinances.
Though the state constitution has continuously provided not only
for the organization of cities and villages,6 but has secured certain
rights and authority to the entities created, 7 the manner in which
such powers are seated in a municipality has undergone vast change.
Originally, the state legislature vested administrative powers individ-
ually on petitioning municipalities.' These legislative enactments would
list in specific terms the powers granted to an individual municipality,
including the police powers delegated to the common council or equiva-
lent body of local government. Within the expressed police powers
the authority to enact ordinances is found.9
The second step in the pendulum's swing toward granting the
individual municipalities greater autonomy is evidenced by the intro-
5. Id. § 7-41(b).
6. N. Y. CoNsTr. art. IX, § 9 (1894).
7. Id. § 12.
8. E.g., N. Y. Sess. Laws 1842, ch. 275, which consolidated many laws relating
to the City of Albany.
9. E.g., Id. § 29.
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duction of population-classification legislation within New York.
Though this concept had been suggested earlier, it was not until the
constitutional revision of 1894 that such legislation was enacted.'"
This was the initial attempt at collective, as distinguished from in-
dividual, legislation in the field of municipal corporation legislation.
The turn of the century brought still greater changes to the mechanics
of municipal legislation," and the trend toward the granting of wider
ranging and less defined powers to municipalities was further evi-
denced by the laws of 1913.12 Of more than a little significance is
the attorney general's comment concerning the latter legislation, in
which he states that while previously it was thought that a municipality
was granted only those powers specifically enumerated by legislative
phraseology, henceforth, legislation granting authority and power to
cities was to be interpreted as delegating all powers not specifically
withheld.'
The legislative trend reached its present status when the City
Home Rule Law was enacted in 1924.14 Though subsequent. amend-
ments have altered its text to some degree, the basic statutory pat-
tern has remained constant.15 As the caption suggests, this law pro-
vides for the establishment of local governments throughout the
state without any regard, even by classification, to the individuality
of the municipality. With its general application and all-inclusive
phraseology, this law is the antithesis of the individually granted
municipal authorizations of the mid-1800's.
In this manner the right of a municipality to legislate locally,
formerly found in express terms within the individually granted city
charters, has grown both in scope and strength. It now exists as a
broad, general legislating power resting with the governing body of
the municipality, and is in fact a general delegation by the legislature
of the state's police power within certain geographical boundaries.
This interpretation is evidenced not only by case law,' 6 but by a re-
cent attorney-general's opinion which stated in part:
10. 3 LINcOLN, CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY or N. Y. STATi 629, 631, 649, 650(1906).
11. N. Y. Sess. Laws 1900, ch. 327.
12. Id. 1913, ch. 247.
13. Ors. ATT'Y GtN. 376 (1913).
14. N. Y. Sess. Laws 1924, ch. 363.
15. The most noteworthy alteration was the repeal of the optional city govern-
ment law (N.Y. Sess. Laws 1939, ch. 765) whose title was self-explanatory of its
text.
16. Ghee v. Northern Union Gas Co., 158 N.Y. 510, 53 N.E. 692 (1898);
reversing 34 App. Div. 551, 56 N.Y.S. 450 (1st Dep't); Tartaglia v. McLaughlin,
190 Misc. 266, 77 N.Y.S.2d 31 (Sup. Ct. 1947), af'd, 273 App. Div. 821, 76 N.Y.S.2d
305 (2d Dep't), rev.d on other grounds, 297 N.Y. 419, 79 N.E. 2d 809 (1948) ; People
v. Gorman, 133 Misc. 161, 231 N.Y.S. 85 (City Ct. 1928).
FALL 1959
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"Unless the legislature has definitely expressed its purpose
to occupy an entire field of legislation, cities are empowered to
enact laws for the preservation and promotion of the health, safety,
and general welfare of their inhabitants." 17
B. Utility Legislation and its Relation to Municipal Ordinances.
The legislative change of direction in granting greater autonomy
to municipalities was not without its counterpart in the field of service
and utility legislation. As with the vesting of powers to municipalities,
the state legislature originally chose to reserve the maximum amount
of power within itself, dealing with various problems and situations
by individual enactment. In this manner, as electricity and other re-
lated services were developed, separate legislation was enacted to con-
trol each situation or need as it arose. This is evidenced not only
by the many laws designed to apply to specific areas of the utility
field, 8 but also by the prolific amount of legislation that was explicitly
directed at some problem found within an individual city or munici-
pality. Illustrative of the latter class of statutes are the related acts
of the 1880's requiring all electrical wiring within the City of New
York to be placed underground.'
Due to the relatively belated development of many of our present
utility services the vast bulk of significant utility legislation appeared
initially in a more generalized form than did municipal law. Indeed,
both the Transportation Law20 and the Public Service Commissions
Law"' antedated in style the municipal law of their day. Thus, just
as the state's police power was gradually being transferred to mu-
nicipalities, the legislature was consolidating public utility law in
an effort to meet the need of state supervision and greater uniformity.
We do not imply by this statement that local laws may supersede state
or federal legislation, but rather that a considerable portion of the
state's police power has been delegated to the municipalities who now
exercise regulatory powers formerly found only within the state legis-
lature, though the state continues to exercise extensive administrative
control over the public utility field. That this co-existence of state and
local authority was intended by the legislators is apparent from the
17. OPs. ATT'y GgN. 124 (1950).
18. Regulation of Telegraph Companies, N.Y. Sess. Laws 1848, ch. 265, and
subsequent amendments thereto too numerous to cite.
19. N.Y. Sess. Laws 1884, ch. 534; Id. 1885, ch. 499; Id. 1886, ch. 503; Id. 1887,
ch. 716. It is to be noted that in accordance with the classification system of mu-
nicipal legislation then in vogue, some of these laws were made applicable to cities
with populations in excess of 500,000, though only one other city within the state
has ever grown to that size and that not until thirty-six years later. (Buffalo passed
the 500,000 mark in 1920).
20. N.Y. Sess. Laws 1890, ch. 566.
21. Id. 1907, ch. 429.
[VOL. 5 : p. 80
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context of the laws themselves, 22 as well as from the standard in-
terpretation these acts receive.23
For this reason we conclude that cities and municipalities do
have the legislative authority under the powers granted by the City
Home Rule Law to enact ordinances relating to the regulation of the
local activities of concerns engaged in the production, supply and
transportation of electricity.
C. The Procedural Aspect of Municipal Ordinances.
Lastly, let us consider at closer range the significance of the
term ordinance, distinguishing it from a local law with which it is
often confused. This distinction is necessitated by the phraseology of
the Home Rule Law which differentiates between the procedural
rules relative to the passage of a municipal ordinance and those
pertinent to the enactment of a local law. An ordinance may be
termed as a municipality's enactment of its police power. A local law,
however, is a municipal enactment springing from the legislature's
delegation of this power. Thus, the latter is distinguished from the
ordinance in that the local law is the establishment of the means or
manner by which an ordinance may be enacted.2 4
The procedural significance of this distinction is that while the
Home Rule Law provides for a public hearing prior to the enactment
of a local law, 25 no such requirement exists relative to ordinances.
Hence, the latter may be enacted at a mere public meeting,26 or such
other session of municipal government that the particular city charter
requires without any prior public hearing on the issue. It is submitted
that this is a major procedural defect in the existing law, in that it
gives birth to legislation whose effect and implications are worthy
of public notice if not state control. It seems that the amount of
faulty compulsory wiring legislation that will receive the attention of
the courts in the following years could be greatly reduced by correc-
tive legislation in this area of the law.
22. N. Y. PUBLIC S4RVicE LAW § 66(1) (Supp. 1958); N. Y. TRANSPORTATION
CORPORATIONS LAW § 11(3) (Supp. 1958).
23. City of New York v. Maltbie, 294 N.Y. 931, 63 N.E.2d 119 (1945); New
York v. Prendergast, 202 App. Div. 308, 195 N.Y.S. 815 (1st Dep't 1922) ; Zuppa
v. Maltbie, 190 Misc. 778, 76 N.Y.S.2d 577 (Sup. Ct. 1947).
24. Bareham v. Rochester, 246 N.Y. 140, 158 N.E. 51 (1927).
25. § 13(5) (Supp. 1958); Pillion v. Magee, 175 Misc. 698, 25 N.Y.S.2d 82
(Sup. Ct. 1941).
26. E.g., CITY oP Nsw ROCHELLt, N. Y., LOCAL LAWS art. I, § 15 (1958).
FALL 1959
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II.
MUNICIPAL LEGISLATIVE POWER IN THE PUBLIC UTILITY FIELD.
A. The Municipality's Right to Regulate the Installation of Electrical
Facilities.
Having reviewed the legislative and historical development of
the individual municipality's right to regulate conduct relative to the
health, safety and general welfare of the public within existing geo-
graphic boundaries, let us now study the effect of such local legisla-
tion on service facilities with particular attention being paid to elec-
trical power installations.
A basic premise in municipal law is that the grantor of a franchise
may regulate the use of the right that it has granted. This ability
to regulate a franchise previously granted is interpreted by the courts
to be an understood condition relative to the original granting of the
right.28 Indeed, it is to be noted that a municipality may require the
modification of existing electrical facilities in conformance with recent
local legislation though such facilities were installed in accordance with
the demands of ordinances existing at the time of their construction. 9
In this manner it may be seen that the law adheres to the maxim that
service corporations acquire no rights superior to those of the public
interest.8" This argument proceeds on the contention that when a
public service company lays power lines it does so with the risk that
the interests of the inhabitants may force the local municipality to
exercise regulatory powers requiring the relocation of these facilities
at a later date.31
The municipality's right to exercise its regulatory powers is
subject to limitation, however. Such limitation, regarding wiring
ordinances, may be said to be based generally on the interpretation
given the term "reasonable" in the light of the particular facts sur-
rounding each individual situation. Nor is the term "reasonable" sub-
ject to mere factual interpretation; an ordinance may be "unreason-
27., People v. Braun, 100 Misc. 343, 166 N.Y.S. 768 (Niagara County Ct. 1917).
28. City of New York v. Woodhaven Gas Co., 96 Misc. 52, 160 N.Y.S. 12 (Sup.
Ct. 1916), rev'd on other grounds, 181 App. Div. 188, 168 N.Y.S. 429 (2d Dep't
1917). This is particularly true where alternate methods of installing new facilities
are available. Long Island Lighting Co. v. Shields, 299 N.Y. 562, 85 N.E.2d 791
(1949).
29. Carlock v. Westchester Lighting Co., 268 N.Y. 345, 197 NE.. 306 (1935)
reversing 242 App. Div. 778, 274 N.Y.S. 580 (2d Dep't 1934).
30. Consolidated Edison v. State, 276 App. Div. 677, 97 N.Y.S.2d 431 (3d Dep't
1950), aff'd, 302 N.Y. 711, 98 N.E.2d 587 (1951).
31. Ibid. Should the service company have entered into a written agreement
with a private land owner, however, thereby obtaining an easement, the latter does
not have a similar right of demanding relocation of the facilities in question. Buell
v. Utica Gas and Elec. Co., 259 N.Y. 443, 182 N.E. 77 (1932).
[VOL. 5 : p. 80
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able", in the court's application of the word, should it attempt to
derogate powers vested in utilities by pertinent state legislation. Thus,
the attempt to prevent an electrical power company from laying in-
stallations benefiting community B within the bounds of community
A was unsuccessful."2 The court held, primarily, that this was not a
reasonable exercise of the municipality's delegated police power, though
this holding is in fact based on the finding that the local ordinance
in question conflicted with existing state legislation. It must be noted,
however, that the companion case to the above illustration sustained
the validity of local legislation requiring the underground installation
of the planned power facilities. 88
The concepts of reasonableness and wiring regulation do not always
coincide, though it is to be readily recognized that such companionship
is to be demanded if the ordinance is to successfully weather litigation
directed at its constitutionality. Past experience has taught current
legislators that their efforts will appear in the strongest light when
the area sought to be regulated is considered to be congested, as
this term is popularly understood in civic discussions.84 It would
appear that a basic legal equation for the evaluation of a wiring ordi-
nance's validity might be arranged in the following manner:
Congested Area + Reasonable Regulation -- Valid Legislation.
Summing up, it may be said that cities and municipalities have
the power to enact ordinances regulating the installation of utility
facilities, including electrical power equipment. Such enactments, how-
ever, are subject to the usual constitutional requirements, viz, in order
to satisfy the requirement of due process, they must not be arbitrary
in effect, they must be clear in meaning, they must present a reasonable
regulation, and they must be directly related to the public interest.
B. Wiring Ordinances Viewed in the Light of the Constitutional
Guarantee of Due Process.
Both the state and federal constitutions limit the legislating
authority that New York municipalities currently enjoy. 8 As defined
32. Long Island Lighting Co. v. Old Brookville, 273 App. Div. 856, 77 N.Y.S.2d
143 (Sup. Ct.), af'd, 298 N.Y. 569, 81 N.E.2d 104 (1948); Consolidated Edison
Co. v. Village of Briarcliff Manor, 208 Misc. 295, 144 N.Y.S.2d 379 (Sup. Ct. 1955).
33. Long Island Lighting Co. v. Shields, 299 N.Y. 562, 85 N.E.2d 791 (1949).
This case is the companion case of Long Island Lighting Co. v. Old Brookville,
supra, note 32, Shields having been the Mayor of the Village of Old Brookville at the
time of the litigation. This decision, handed down shortly after the Old Brookville
one, held that the ordinance prohibiting overhead power (high tension) lines was
reasonable in light of the fact that the lines were not yet built and there was no
prohibition against installing the facilities by the alternate method available (sub-
surface).
34. See notes 32 and 33, supra.
35. U. S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1; N. Y. CONST. art. I. § 6 (1894).
FALL 1959
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by the Supreme Court, the requirement of due process demands that
a law shall not be unreasonable, arbitrary, or capricious and that the
means selected shall have a real and substantial relation to the end
sought to be attained. 6 Further, should a statute require the per-
formance of an act in such vague terms that men of common intelli-
gence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its in-
terpretation, the due process provisions of the respective constitutions
would again be violated.17 It might be well to note at this point of
our discussion the well-settled principle of law that legislation may
be declared unconstitutional due to its operative effect, though on its
face the law is apparently valid."' Let us now examine municipal
wiring ordinances in the light of these restrictions with reference not
only to stare decisis, but also to the current trend in this area of legis-
lation as exemplified by the sample ordinance quoted in the intro-
ductory segment of this article.
Financial Considerations.
While the cost that the affected utility must bear as a result of a
wiring ordinance's enaction is not necessarily a controlling factor,
nevertheless, the courts view such potential expenditure with consid-
erable interest 9 wherever the validity of the ordinance is challenged
on the ground that it is unfair or unreasonable and cannot be justified
in a particular situation. In these instances the court understands it
to be a duty to determine whether the expenditure required is reason-
able in the light of all the surrounding circumstances.40 This point is
of particular interest in New York as a direct result of the Home
Rule Law, inasmuch as the approval of one such ordinance has a
direct bearing on the advent of similar legislation throughout the
state. Thus, not only must the local economics of the instance at
hand be considered, but the expense necessitated by the enactment of
similar local legislation by other communities must be reviewed. It is
not too hard to envision a situation where practical necessity would
demand a ruling of invalidity for the aforementioned reason, though
locally the benefits of the ordinance might merit a better fate.
36. Paramount Pictures v. Langer, 306 U.S. 619 (1939).
37. Standard Oil of Louisiana v. Porterie, 12 F. Supp. 100 (D.C. La. 1935).
38. People v. Chas. Scheinier Press, 214 N.Y. 395, 108 N.E. 639 (1915) ; Belden
v. Union Cent. Life Ins. Co., 143 Ohio St. 329, 55 N.E.2d 629 (1944).
39. In re Boston Edison Co., 79 P.U.R. (n.s.) 1 (1949).
40. Nashville, Chattanooga & St. L. Ry. v. Walters, 294 U.S. 405 (1935).
[VOL. 5 : p. 80
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Franchise Regulation.
We have noted earlier the demand for reasonableness where a
municipality seeks to regulate a franchise right that it has granted.
We have also noted the relation between reasonableness and physical
congestion of the area defined by the subject ordinance. However,
where the legislation does not limit its application to admittedly con-
gested areas of the municipality in question, and by this we mean
areas that are considered congested at the time of the legislative
enactment's promulgation, such an ordinance exceeds the hitherto
defined limitations of the term reasonable and may be found to have
little or no relation to existing necessity. Considering the municipal
enactment that we have cited as an illustration of the modern trend
in wiring ordinances, it will be noted that this is an obvious example
of potential legislating; no physical boundaries are described. Rather,
this statute intends to apply to all areas and corners of the city with-
out regard to use, zoning, congestion or public necessity. It is a
watered-down version of a 100% underground stipulation that has
been diluted in the hope of achieving constitutionally what has here-
tofore been considered an illegal purpose. Concededly, the relationship
between reasonableness and congestion will have to be either re-
evaluated or cast aside if we are to enjoy a general relocation of
electrical facilities. The exact change the future holds is open to
conjecture, but it is submitted that those ordinances defining by estab-
lished bounds (i.e., streets and the like) the area made subject to power
facility relocation stand a better chance of receiving the approval of
the courts.
Required Relocation.
Inasmuch as electrical power companies make continuous and
thorough inspections of their physical facilities, providing replacement
items whenever required, the reasonableness of any ordinance which
requires the relocation of such facilities must be founded on positive
public benefit derived from such legislation. A standard utility argu-
ment against the validity of wiring ordinances which do not limit
themselves and their application to areas of admitted congestion is
that apart from the allegedly prohibitive cost of such relocation, there
is no substantial benefit of positive value accruing to the public from
such a venture. Turning to our sample ordinance, we see that this
contention finds solid support. The terms of the ordinance provide
for the installation of underground wiring in a piecemeal, as land is
FALL 1959
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improved, fashion. In this manner, neighboring realty might have
different types of electrical power service for an indefinite period, with
little real benefit resulting to either owner. Indeed, not only would
the appearance of this sectional changeover be vine-like and slightly
incongruous, but the cost of such a haphazard conversion would be
many times that of converting the whole community at one time."'
Aesthetic Considerations.
Aesthetic reasons themselves, unrelated to the requirements of
the public health, safety or welfare will not justify the exercise of a
municipality's police power.42 While the police power is broad in
scope and its legitimate area of application is both general and com-
prehensive, it is nevertheless fundamental that the exercise of this
power must be limited to the attainment of legitimate objectives. Such
power, therefore, is not to be viewed as an unlimited source of legis-
lation. Rather, its exercise terminates precisely where the reason for
its existence ends.4 The police power is not designed for increasing
or even preserving the economic value of property, and the courts
are guided by the consideration of the purpose behind a statute in de-
termining its validity.
44
Public Safety.
Let us now weigh the contention that the public safety is increased
by the enactment of underground wiring ordinances in non-congested
areas. In non-congested areas the accident prevention argument of wir-
ing legislation's proponents receives little support, if any, from the rec-
ord of past litigation. In fact, the above-ground installation's accessibility
for repair and maintenance combined with the tremendous number
of excavation accidents constantly occurring would seem to indicate
that the public safety, as such, receives no greater benefit from the
installation of underground electrical facilities, except where building
and population congestion demand such action. The initial thought
that many accidents involving surface mounted power facilities could
be avoided should such installations be maintained underground suf-
fers from one glaring weakness. Underground facilities breed their
own particular brand of accidents based on a constantly recurring
41. Presently, only those cities in New York with populations in excess of
500,000 have the authority to legislate for complete underground wiring, N.Y. Sess.
Laws 1884, ch. 534; Id. 1885, ch. 499.
42. Wondrak v. Kelley, 129 Ohio St. 268, 195 N.E. 65 (1935).
43. MCQUILLIN, MUNICIPAL CORPORATOlONS, §§ 24.03-24.09 (1949).
44. Dobbins v. Los Angeles, 195 U.S. 223 (1904).
[VOL. 5 : p. 80
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principle, lack of notice of the injury-causing condition, be it the power
facility itself or a temporary physical state related to the latter.
It might be well to distinguish at this point the Village of Old
Brookville decision,45 noted earlier in this paper,4" from the common
factual basis for a wiring ordinance. In the majority of instances
including the cited municipal ordinance quoted within our introduc-
tion, power lines are presently in existence within the area sought to
be directly affected by the legislation. In the Brookville case a different
situation prevailed. There, a lighting company sought to lay hitherto
non-existent power facilities within the municipality, such lines more-
over being ecclusively for the benefit of other communities. Further,
the line in question was a high tension facility as distinguished from
local feeder lines and service facilities that make up the greater por-
tion of elevated power installations in most municipalities. Thus, in
the Brookville case the argument for public safety, though not suffi-
cient of itself to support the final decision of the court, did contain
some merit when viewed in the light of the existing facts, namely,
that the power line under debate was not in existence presently, but
was to be constructed in the future; therefore no relocation of facili-
ties was demanded. Rather, the municipality was petitioning the court
to enforce an ordinance relative to new power installations. As the
power facility was for the use of neighboring consumers outside of
the municipal litigant's boundaries, it was not unreasonable to de-
mand that the power line be installed below ground since the pro-
posed single cable would not feed any other facility within that mu-
nicipality. So, while it may be argued that public safety was a con-
tributing factor in requiring underground installation of the subject
high tension cable, it was not the sole, nor even the most important,
foundation for such a decision. Moreover, the court's opinion limits
itself clearly to the facts of the litigated issues.
C. Legislation Must Be Clear in Meaning.
To say that an ordinance is sufficiently clear as to enable men of
common intelligence to interpret it in a generally uniform manner is
to recognize a measure of clarity and certainty in its text. The pro-
visions for municipal legislation in the City Home Rule Law are
directly responsible for much litigation on this point due to the com-
parative autonomy that New York municipalities enjoy. As each in-
dividual ordinance must be examined by itself to determine whether
45. Long Island Lighting Co. v. Old Brookville, 273 App. Div. 856, 77 N.Y.S.2d
143 (Sup. Ct.), aff'd, 298 N.Y. 569, 81 N.E.2d 104 (1948).
46. See notes 32 and 33, supra.
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its phraseology is sufficiently definitive to meet the demands of con-
stitutional interpretation, we cannot generalize in this area. Nor is
it our intention to belabor the subject of statutory construction. Rather,
we will examine the sample ordinance quoted earlier in an effort to
illustrate the lack of explicitness so often found in local legislation,
and with an aim to determine the minimum demands of clarity in
wiring ordinances.
The cited ordinance limits its application to wires "supplying
current" to specific realty. This phrase may be interpreted in a variety
of ways. In a technical sense, which facilities "supply" current to a
particular user? How far must we trace the particles of electricity
into the distrikution system? While the authors of the ordinance
state that it was their intention to affect merely the poles and wiring
fronting and connecting the lead-in facilities,4' this interpretation can-
not be said to be either obvious or exclusive from the text of the
statute. It is suggested that wiring ordinance authors would promote
the validity of their efforts by (1) including therein a definition of
terms used within the ordinance, and (2) relating the application
of the ordinance to definite and fixed boundaries.
The terminology found within our sample wiring ordinance pro-
vides an excellent opportunity for us to illustrate the need not only
for a definition of terms within the legislation, but for the use of proper
language within the statute's provisions, both of which will insure
clarity as well as promote reasonableness.
The author of the instant legislation intended to include "all
realty developments ... calling for the erection of two or more houses
or buildings . .. (and) . . . all commercial and office buildings"."
The draftsman, using the phraseology "non-residential buildings ...
or ...any real estate development consisting of two or more private
residences . . .,,49 attempted to bring single-building apartment houses
within the application of the section. The use of the term "residence",
however, is such as to apparently cause the law's application to a
single family structure which is converted to contain one or more
additional apartment residences.
Nor is the question as to the law's effect on multiple dwellings
the only one raised by the sample legislation's text. The term "de-
velopment" is also subject to considerable discussion. How proximate
must construction points be to come within the application of this
47. Interviews with leaders of civic redevelopment in the City of New Rochelle,
N. Y., October 1958.
48. Ibid.
49. Ibid.
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ordinance? Is a distinction to be drawn between the instance where
adjoining land owners commission the same builder to construct their
homes and that where the builder or realty group construct the homes
before selling the home and land as a parcel? Further, the phrase
"hereafter erected" is subject to considerable debate as to its meaning.
While the author of the ordinance intended application of the statute's
provisions to "new real estate developments and to the re-develop-
ment of existing city streets", 50 the draftsman interprets his enacted
terminology to apply to existing city streets wherein the required
construction is initiated.5
The confusion presented by the various interpretations to which
the sample ordinance is subject is illustrative of the semantical chaos
which seems to result when legislation fails to contain a definition
of terms used therein, and attempts to be potentially all-inclusive in
nature. The emphasis in the past has been on congestion as support-
ing reasonableness in wiring legislation. Only two cities in New
York are authorized to compel underground wiring throughout their
geographic areas, the standard for such authorization being a popu-
lation of 500,000.52 With this in mind, the contention is repeated
that despite the current trend away from requiring congestion to sup-
port wiring ordinances, the concept of fixed and definite boundaries,
rather than potentially all-inclusive application, will continue to be
understood as implied in the interpretation of reasonableness relative
to wiring legislation.
III.
RATE DISCRIMINATION As APPLIED To MUNICIPAL
WIRING ORDINANCES.
To understand properly the meaning of the term "discrimination"
as it is popularly applied to public utility rate controversies, it is first
necessary to consider the duties owed the public by the servicing com-
panies. In this regard it may be said that the existing law53 requires
the latter to treat all customers alike insofar as they are objectively
similar. Rate distinctions are permitted only where a reasonable basis
for subjecting customers to different rates is found to exist. It might
be mentioned, however, that where such a distinction between cus-
tomers exists, a rate differentiation is demanded since treating cus-
50. Ibid.
51. Ibid.
52. Le., New York and Buffalo; see note 41, supra.
53. N. Y. PUBLIC SRVIC4 LAw § 65 (1955).
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tomers of different groups alike would be unfair to one of these
groups. This approved diversity of treatment may rest on a significant
difference in the service offered, 54 or on some other condition relative to
servicing the respective customers.5 Our purpose at this point is to
determine whether the enactment of a wiring ordinance in and of
itself provides the affected utilities with sufficient cause to justify a
rate increase within that municipality reflecting the additional reloca-
tion expenditure forced upon the utility. This question is of basic
importance, as the validity of a subsequent rate increase can be ex-
pected to be the subject of intense litigation immediately following
the court's approval of a wiring ordinance affecting presently non-
congested areas.
A. Discrimination - A Factual Interpretation.
Much of the litigation concerning discriminatory rate schedules
has arisen from erroneously projected classifications within the rate
schedules themselves, rather than from direct attempts to circumvent
the law. This statement finds ready support from the fact that rate
determinations are often limited to the facts of a particular situation.
The repetition of certain circumstances, however, enables us to trace
the reasoning of both commissions and courts and to form certain
basic conclusions therefrom.
One of the more lucid descriptions of rate discrimination may
be found in these words:
"Discrimination exists if two customers, or classes of custo-
mers, are charged the same price for different services, or differ-
ent prices for similar services." 58
It has been held that a utility may neither give an undue preference
to any customer, nor subject a customer to an unreasonable dis-
advantage or prejudice." Thus, rates need not be uniform to be legal,58
though where a difference exists such must be based on reasonable
and current distinctions in the services offered.5" Moreover, while
54. Re Troy Gas Co., 25 St. Dep't Rep. 370 (1921).
55. Ten Ten Lincoln Place v. Consolidated Edison., 190 Misc. 174, 73 N.Y.S.2d
2 (Sup. Ct. 1947), aff'd, 273 App. Div. 903, 77 N.Y.S.2d 168 (2d Dep't 1948).
56. Re Mountain Fuel Supply Co., 75 P.U.R. (n.s.) 52, 55 (1948).
57. Public Serv. Comm. v. Iroquois Natural Gas Co., 189 App. Div. 545, 179
N.Y.S. 230 (4th Dep't 1919).
58. Pittsburgh v. Pennsylvania P.U.C., 171 Pa. Super 187, 90 A.2d 607 (1952);
Pittsburgh v. Pennsylvania P.U.C., 168 Pa. Super. 95, 78 A.2d 35 (1951) ; Shanis
v. Philadelphia Electric Co., 88 P.U.R. (n.s.) 258 (1950).
59. North Carolina ex rel Util. Comm. v. Municipal Corp. of Scotland Neck,,
243 N.C. 193, 90 S.E.2d 519 (1955) ; Re San Juan Pipe Line Co., 84 P.U.R. (n.s.)
129 (1950); Re Mountain States Power Co., 80 P.U.R. (n.s.) 111 (1949).
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the uses to which the service is put by different consumers are not
of themselves a sufficient distinction to support a difference in rates,60
nevertheless, where the difference in the service extended consists in
the actual supplying of such service, 6' rather than what occurs after
the utility item is employed by the customer, a difference in rates is
permissible.
One further point is significant in defining rate discrimination
in this field. The premise that rate differences are prohibited only
where they are unjustified6" refers not only to situations where a rate
schedule shows discriminatory practice on its face, but to the exten-
sion of uniform rates for dissimilar services. In the latter instance
excessive rates are being charged to the aggrieved class of consumers
while the remaining class of customers are benefiting through the
application of an unfair, albeit uniform, rate schedule.63
In considering the rationale necessary to support a reasonable
distinction in customer classification, the Public Service Law 4 pro-
vides some definite standards: quantity used, time when used, purpose
for which used, duration of use, and any other reasonable considera-
tion. 65 The underlying factor in all of these terms as well as in all
the other various tests applied by the commission and the courts is
the allocation of costs. In fact, allocation of the cost of providing
the services extended has been openly considered as the most reason-
able guide to proper rates.66 However, while the standard of cost
allocation is widely endorsed in determining the reasonableness of
utility rates and the proper differences therein, 7 it is not unlimited
in its application. Along with other apparently reasonable distinctions
this rationale supporting rate differences is least successful when ap-
plied to rates offered consumers among whom there is no apparent
physical, geographical or technical difference. Thus, while a utility
may legitimately pass on the cost of local taxes to consumers within
the particular taxing municipality,6" and is allowed rate differences
60. Village of Warsaw v. Warsaw Gas & Elec. Co., 24 St. Dep't Rep. 1 (1920).
61. Re Troy Gas Co., 25 St. Dep't Rep. 370 (1921).
62. Re Boston Edison Co., 98 P.U.R. (n.s.) 427 (1953).
63. Re Adirondack Power and Light Corp., 27 St. Dep't Rep. 585 (1922).
64. § 65 (Supp. 1958).
65. Id. § 65(5); see Ten Ten Lincoln Place v. Consolidated Edison, 190 Misc.
173, 73 N.Y.S.2d 2 (Sup. Ct. 1947), aff'd, 273 App. Div. 903, 77 N.Y.S.2d 168
(2d Dep't 1948).
66. Re Mountain Fuel Supply Co., 75 P.U.R. (n.s.) 52 (1948).
67. New Rochelle Water Co. v. Maltbie, 248 App. Div. 66, 289 N.Y.S. 388(3d Dep't 1936); N. Y. Edison Co. v. Maltbie, 244 App. Div. 436, 279 N.Y.S. 949
(3d Dep't 1935) ; Re Adirondack Power and Light Co., 26 St. Dep't Rep. 1 (1921).
68. Missouri v. Missouri Pub. Serv. Comm., 23 P.U.R.3d 164 (1958); Re Mon-
tana-Dakota Util. Co., 15 P.U.R.3d 246 (1956); Re Utah Power & Light Co., 95
P.U.R. (n.s.) 390 (1952); Re Mountain Fuel Supply Co., 94 P.U.R. (n.s.) 88
(1952).
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based upon the diversity of population in different areas,69 rate dis-
tinctions among customers within an individual municipality are very
hard to justify in the absence of obvious and controlling factors. In-
deed, when similar consumers are located side by side it is almost
impossible to show a true and definite distinction in respective cost
allocation of services offered.7 Moreover, public policy would appear
to be against an artificial delineation of an otherwise homogeneous
class of customers.7 1
B. Existing Precedent Applied to Wiring Ordinances.
Let us define the scope of our discussion at the outset. Municipal
ordinances relating in application to congested areas, as defined by
specific boundaries, will not be the subject of projected contentions,
though they will be used as a foundation for our discussion. This
statement is made in the light of existing precedent which appears
constant and established in this area of the law. In relation to wiring
ordinances affecting admittedly congested areas of a municipality, two
principles of rate scheduling have evolved: (1) the consumers directly
benefiting from the installation of sub-surface power facilities may
not be subjected to higher rates than their intra-municipal neighbors
whose service continues to be of the elevated variety; (2) a complete
municipality may be re-rated to reflect the expense of power facility
relocation effected within that municipality. The conclusions are
based on the following rationale:
1. The whole city or municipality is in fact benefiting from the
underground location of power facilities within a congested
area, thus making it unfair to burden only those tapping
their service directly therefrom with an increased rate sched-
ule.7
2
2. The cost of sub-surface power facility construction must be
assessed among all parties serviced by power transmitted
through such conduit, though the latter be situated a mile
or more from where the underground facilities are re-
surfaced.
7 3
69. Consumers v. Missouri Edison Co., 22 P.U.R.3d 427 (1958).
70. F. & R. Lazarus & Co. v. Ohio P.U.C., 162 Ohio St. 223, 122 N.E.2d 783(1954).
71. Re Jamaica Water Supply Co., 97 P.U.R. (n.s.) 467 (1953).
72. See note 70, supra.
73. Ibid.
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3. As mentioned earlier, the authorities are loath to approve
rate differences within a city or other sectionalized area in
the absence of a definite and clear factual distinction between
customers.
74
Let us now apply these propositions to the trend in modern
wiring legislation - ordinances requiring underground installation
of power facilities, either in a defined but presently non-congested
area, or in a potentially all-inclusive fashion.
Utility companies are allowed a fair return for their lighting
system, 75 and the courts have recognized the fact that there is no
definite formula which indicates the maximum ratio of administrative
cost to the rate charged. 76 Further, the determination of rate areas
and classifications is admittedly an administrative function that should
not be disturbed save for abuse of discretion or lack of evidence as
to the existence of allegedly differentiating factors. Bearing this in
mind, it would appear that future wiring legislation affecting non-
congested areas will not alter existing precedent regarding pertinent
rate revisions. All consumers within an enacting municipality's bounds,
as distinguished from those directly served from the sub-surface fa-
cilities, will bear the cost of such relocation of power installations
within the enactment-enforcing municipality. This practice is dictated
by the very effort of avoiding discrimination, much like passing the
cost of locally imposed license fees and taxes on to the customers
located within the limits of the taxing community. To do otherwise,
and pass the peculiarly local expenses on to the customers of neighbor-
ing communities not imposing similar restrictions or requirements on
the servicing company would be to charge the latter group with benefits
accruing to another municipality. Such practice would force the
hitherto non-legislating communities to enact similar ordinances in
order to gain equality of treatment.
Lastly, as such rate differentiation would be based on a munici-
pal or other definite and sectionalized grouping of customers, the
public policy against permitting cost allocation schedules to become
the sole basis for substantiating different rates within an otherwise
homogeneous class of consumers would not be applicable. The custo-
mers affected by such a change of rates would be readily ascertainable
by basic and apparent municipal boundary lines. As residents of a
74. See note 71, supra.
75. Village of Boonville v. Maltbie, 272 N.Y. 40, 4 N.E.2d 209 (1936).
76. Natona Mills, Inc. v. Pennsylvania P.U.C., 179 Pa. Super. 263, 116 A.2d
876 (1955).
77. Pittsburgh v. Pennsylvania P.U.C., 187 Pa. Super. 341, 144 A.2d 648 (1958).
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community enacting such an ordinance they would be receiving a
benefit not enjoyed by similar customers whose local government
had not passed such legislation.
These contentions are supported by the findings of a California
Public Utilities Commission hearing, which approved the petition of
the Southern California Edison Company and authorized a special
underground rate schedule submitted by the applicant utility."8 The
surcharge approved is applicable to those accounts in municipalities
serviced by sub-surface power distribution systems required by law-
fully exercised legislative action, as distinguished from systems in-
stalled for the utility's convenience."' It is submitted, then, that the
current practices and precedent regarding the approval of power
company rate revisions which reflect the financial burden of local legis-
lation will continue to be observed by the courts in the oncoming age
of wiring ordinances not specifically related or limited in application
to congested areas.
IV.
CONCLUSION.
It has been our aim in the foregoing pages to acquaint the
reader with the current status of both the problems and effects of
compulsory underground wiring statutes within New York State. Due
to the particular provisions of the City Home Rule Law it may well
be that some of the topics discussed are local only to New York and
those other jurisdictions where comparable legislation has evolved.
However, this does not limit the application of our study to jurisdic-
tions with similar procedures concerning municipal legislation, be-
cause wiring ordinances which bear no relation to congestion found
within the area they affect are of national significance. Moreover,
the unique position New York State enjoys as a conservative leader
in law and legislation, as well as that of a giant in the commercial
and financial field, makes activity within the Empire State certain
of observance and possibly of emulation elsewhere. Two things seem
certain. More and more cities and municipalities throughout our
country are going to legislate in an attempt to enforce wiring ordi-
nances unrelated to area congestion. In addition, the city of tomorrow
will receive all of its power through sub-surface installations, regard-
less of what molecular combination may be the powerizing factor.
78. California P.U.C. Decision No. 54384 (Jan. 1957).
79. Id.
[VOL. 5 : p. 80
19
Hooley: Compulsory Underground Wiring - A Battle Rejoined in Public Utili
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1959
FALL 1959 COMPULSORY UNDERGROUND WIRING 99
Between today and tomorrow then, legislating will and must
proceed until the proper combination of terms is found that will en-
force complete underground wiring in both a practical, as well as
'constitutional, manner. This combination does not exist within
New York today, save for our two largest cities where population
congestion supports the necessity and constitutionality of such statutes.
Admittedly, the attitude of the courts will have more than a little
to do in deciding the time when congestion and related terms cease
to play an important role in determining the validity of an ordinance
enforcing underground wiring, as well as the resultant rate litigation,
and general all-inclusive wiring ordinances become standard sections
in municipal codes. We offer this article not as determinative in fore-
casting such a future date, but in the vein of briefly summarizing
the historical development of the New York law, procedural and
substantive, on the subject and in presenting some problems and effects
of compulsory underground wiring ordinances.
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